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_-_ _ Introduction
The aircraft design engineer today is tasked with satisfying an increasing number of con-
flicting requirements.The fact that conflict in these requirements may be technically, eco-
nomically, or politically motivated usually compounds the difficulty of determining the best
solution to a design issue. In this regard, propulsion/airframe integration for supersonic air-
planes must rank as one of the most challenging aspects of airplane design.
For the cruise Mach numbers currently being considered for High-Speed Civil Transport
(HSCT) airplanes, the inlet requirements of low drag, low bleed flow, and high pressure re-
covery appear to be best met with a mixed-compression design. Unfortunately, these desir-
able attributes come with a highly undesirable companion: the inlet unstart phenomenon.
Concern over the effects of a mixed-compression inlet unstart on the vehicle dynamics of
large, high-speed aircraft is not new; a comprehensive wind-tunnel study addressing the
problem (ref. 1) was published in 1962. Additional investigations of the problem were made
throughout the United States SST program and the follow-on NASA programs into the late
1970's. The current study sought to examine the magnitude of the problem in order to deter-
mine if an inlet unstart posed a potential hazard severe enough to preclude the use of mixed-
compression inlets on proposed HSCT concepts.
Supersonic commercial airplane inlet unstart
susceptibility is not a new concern
o NASA off-design mass flow test (1962)
o NASA inlet isolation concepts (1966)
o Boeing analytical studies (1969, 1976)
o Lockheed wind-tunnel tests (1976)
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The Inlet Unstart Phenomenon
The term unstart refers to the expulsion of the shock system intemal to the cowl in a
mixed-compression or internal-compression inlet. An abrupt change in operating conditions
(e.g., wind shear or large freestream temperature change) may cause an unstart. During an
unstart, the inlet mass flow is drastically reduced, and its drag is greatly increased. Due to
the abrupt mass flow reduction and increase in inlet flow distortion, the affected engine's
compressor may stall and its combustor flame out. An unstart may also be caused by a com-
pressor stall upon a sudden change in engine airflow demand such as afterbumer ignition.
Inlets with increasing amounts of intemal compression, more desirable as cruise 1Vlach num-
ber increases, tend to be less tolerant of operating disturbances. Some experimental evi-
dence reported in reference 2 suggests that an axisymmetric inlet configuration may exhibit
greater angle of attack tolerance than an equivalent two-dimensional configuration.
The shock wave that propagates upstream during a compressor stall is termed a hammer-
shock. Once a compressor stall has commenced, the expulsion of the hammershock takes
place in milliseconds. Figure 1, from reference 3, indicates that the static pressure at the en-
gine compressor face produced by a hammershock may be more than twice the static pres-
sure in the inlet during normal operation, and that the strength of the hammershock is
directly proportional to the compressor system static pressure ratio. A particularly strong
hammershock may cause damage to the inlet structure and precipitate engine damage.
Comparison of Hammershock Pressure Ratios
for Several Engines
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An inlet unstart haseffectson an aircraft besidesengine operation. As illustrated in figure
2, from reference4, the flow upstream of an unstarted inlet may interact with the boundary
layer on adjacent surfaces.If the affected boundary layer happensto be on a wing or other
airframe component with flight control surfaces, the potential exists for degradation of con-
trol surface effectiveness and increaseddrag due to shock-induced boundary layer thicken-
ing or separation. Ingestion of the thickened boundary layer by the engine could also affect
engine operation andmake a restart more difficult. The bow shock of anunstarted inlet may
impinge on adjacent engine inlets and causethem to unstart also.
The asymmetrical changesin the engine thrust, inlet drag, and nacelle pressure field be-
neath the wing for "conventional" HSCT configurations could causethe airplane to pitch,
roll, and yaw. The loss of thrust and increasein drag would also result in an abrupt deceler-
ation. Severalmethods, both passiveand active, have beenproposed to minimize theseve-
hicle dynamic effects. Passiveapproachesseek to reduce the effects of an inlet unstart
through judicious nacelle placement and the useof fixed aerodynamic devices to prevent
unstart propagation. Active approachesinvolve minimizing the asymmetry of the flight con-
dition through the useof automatic engine and flight controls. The required level of control
automation appearsto be well within the current stateof the art.
Shock/Boundary Layer Interaction due to Inlet Unstart
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Figure 3, also drawn from reference4, shows the nacelle spacing requirements for apair
of axisymmetric, Mach 3, mixed-compression inlets to prevent anunstart on one inlet from
unstarting the other. The unstarted inlet in this casewas in a steady-statebuzz condition.
The author of this referencecautioned that thesedata should be viewed with reservation for
designpurposes,asthey may dependon the degreeof shock/boundary layer interaction
present and on the operating characteristics of the inlets under consideration. Conservatism
would dictate somewhat greater spacing requirements than thoseshown in the figure.
The difficulty in predicting the occuranceof mutual unstarts and the susceptibility of a
given inlet configuration to the problem is substantial. Contrary to what might beexpected,
it was also noted in reference4 that an unstart in one branch of the bifurcated inlet of the
XB-70 airplane did not generally induce anunstart on the other side.This characteristic was
thought to be at leastpartly attributable to the inlet configuration of the XB-70, a vertical
wedge mounted beneatha large boundary layer separation plate.
Nacelle Separation Requirements
M=3, mixed-compression, axisymmetric inlets; steady-state buzz
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Another passive concept that hasbeen testedsuccessfully (ref. 5) in the prevention of
mutual unstarts is the splitter plate. Figure 4 is an artist's concept of a splitter plate installed
on a twin-engine nacelle to isolate one inlet duct from the other. It was reported in reference
5 that splitter plates of practical sizewill isolate an unstarted inlet at Mach 2.5 if the mass
flow ratio of the unstarted inlet is maintained above about 0.65. The plates remained effec-
tive for yaw anglesup to 6 degreeswindward. For nacelle installations close to the wing un-
dersurface (low mounting pylon heights), it was found necessaryto eliminate any gap
between the splitter plate and the wing. Splitter plates have also been proposed for installa-
tion between axisymmetric, individually-podded engines (ref. 6) to prevent propagation of
unstarts. The required size and effectiveness of suchan installation is not known.
Active control systemshave been implemented on the SR-71 and Concorde aircraft to
minimize vehicle accelerationsand displacement angles. The SR-71 inlet control system in-
corporateswhat is called a crosstie; upon detection of an inlet unstart on one side of the air-
craft both inlets immediately begin a restart cycle, thus avoiding a large lateral-directional
force asymmetry. A similar philosophy was proposed by Boeing in a 1977 supersonic trans-
port configuration study (ref. 7.) A prototype digital integrated airframe/propulsion control
system was successfully tested (ref. 8) as a replacement for the original analog systems on
the SR-71 in 1979. The Concorde's air intake control system, described in reference 9, is
linked to an autorudder control in order to prevent the development of unacceptably large
sideslip angles upon detection of an engine or intake malfunction.
Inlet Splitter Plate Concept
c
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Inlet Unstart Effects on an HSCT Concept
Reference 6 also provided data upon which a simple kinematic analysis of inlet unstart
effects on an HSCT vehicle concept was based. These data, summarized in figure 5, con-
sisted of wind-tunnel test results for an aircraft configuration very similar to those currently
under consideration, but with three different nacelle locations. Each of the nacelle locations
was tested at three different inlet mass flow ratios, accomplished by varying the amount of
internal blockage in the model nacelle. Area blockages of 0%(free-flowing), 50% and
100%(no flow through) were tested.
Wind-tunnel Test Data Summary
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Figure 6 illustrates the resultsof oil flow studies done during the Lockheed wind-tunnel
test; the effect of the simulated unstarted inlet (50% blocked nacelle) on the wing stream-
lines is substantial and clearly evident. The photographs were taken at atest Mach number
of 1.6 and anangle of attack of two degrees.Though the photographs show nacelle N1,
which was the inboard nacelle mounted on the upper surfaceof the wing, similar results
would beexpected for nacelles mounted beneaththe wing. One of the conclusions stated in
reference 6 was that, basedon thesedata, the over/under nacelle installation of the Lock-
heedconcept posed lessof a problem upon inlet unstart than a conventional four-engine un-
derwing installation.
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The following assumptions were made in the kinematic analysis in addition to the use of
the wind-tunnel data just described. For conservatism, and since the analysis was for an in-
stantaneous (peak) condition rather than a sustained, steady-state condition, the drag force
of the hammershock pressure pulse acting over the assumed inlet capture area was included
and only rigid airplane motion was considered. Additionally, the snapshot analysis does not
include forces and moments opposing the unstart that would be generated by the basic air-
frame aerodynamics or flight control system.
Assumptions
o Sample configuration as per CR-145133
o Engine-out condition initiated at M=2.0, h=55000 ft, n=1.0
o Outboard engine, locked rotor
o Inboard engine, inlet unstarted
o Roll, pitch, and yaw inertias from NASA AST-105 configuration
o Wind-tunnel data from Lockheed test (underwing nacelles only)
o Seized engine taken as 100% blocked condition
o Unstarted engine taken as 50% blocked condition
o Thrust of failed engines zero; cruise thrust (12,500 Ib) on others
o Hammershock pressure pulse included in drag force
o Instantaneous accelerations and angular rates only
o Rigid-airplane motion only
o No opposing propulsive or aerodynamic control forces
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The free-body diagram presented in figure 7 was used in the kinematic analysis. Dimen-
sions shown are generally representative of a Mach 2.5,290-passenger vehicle with a gross
weight of 600,000 lb as described in reference 6. The accelerations were analyzed at the
crew station because it was the point furthest from the airplane center of gravity, about
which the angular acceleration rates were calculated.
Inlet Unstart Analysis Force Arrangement
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Results of the analysis are shown in the accompanying table below. Even with the sub-
stantial level of conservatism in the analysis, the acceleration levels at the crew station are
seento be relatively mild. The instantaneousacceleration ratesat cabin locations closer to
the airplane center of gravity would be even lower. The accelerationscalculated areof the
sameorder of magnitude asthoseexperienced in light to moderate turbulence in a modem
subsonic transport, or in anautomobile on a rough road.
In short, although the forces on the airplane during anunstart are large, so is its inertia.
Therefore, unless the unstart forces are sustained and unopposed by the pilot, flight control
system, engine controls, or combinations thereof, large rates and angular displacements are
unlikely to develop. The potential for passenger injury due to vehicle motions induced by an
unstart thus appears no more serious than that due to normal atmospheric turbulence. There
is, however, a passenger-related aspect to the unstart problem that may require further in-
vestigation. It is likely that the noise of an inlet unstart (probably like a muffled explosion)
would be very distressing to passengers, and attempts should be made to explore the magni-
tude of this problem.
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Althoughthe forces involved are large, so are the airplane
inertias; thus the resulting accelerations are small
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situation; steady-state values will be lower
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Validation of Results
With the tabulated values in hand, an attempt was made to find flight data to test the va-
lidity of the calculated accelerations. Figure 8, from reference 10, shows the lateral and lon-
gitudinal responses of the Concorde aircraft to a double engine surge. Recall that the
automatic flight control system of the airplane immediately applies corrective rudder input
upon sensing an asymmetrical thrust condition; this can be seen clearly in the recording of
rudder angle. The aircraft stabilizes in about 12 seconds at very small angles of bank and
sideslip, and decelerates smoothly at constant altitude. The control surface deflections re-
quired to contain the transient are quite small.
The double engine surge condition is presented for the Concorde because it is the practi-
cal equivalent of a double unstart as described for the conceptual HSCT. The Concorde in-
lets do not "unstart" in the strict sense of the word, because they are basically an extemal-
compression design. However, like other external-compression inlets, they are susceptible
to the buzz instability, and incorporate active control measures similar to those required for
mixed-compression inlets.
Concorde Response to Double Engine Surge
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A similar flight test history was found in reference 11 for the XB-70 airplane, and is pre-
sented in figure 9. The reactions to a double unstart in this case are somewhat more pro-
nounced than those of the Concorde; however, recall that the XB-70 traces shown are for
Mach 3 as compared to Concorde's Mach 2 cruise. A pilot's description of an XB-70 unstart
transient was published in reference 12. The unstart transient was termed "mild," with about
25% of the available roll control power being used to counter the induced rolling motion.
The comment was also made that even though most XB-70 inlet unstarts were deliberate,
each unstart event was startling even to a crew experienced in flight testing.
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Considerable attention hasbeendevoted in popular aviation literature to the inlet unstart
behavior exhibited by the YF-12 / SR-71 airplane. Colorful metaphors and dire predictions
of helmets slamming into cockpit windows make entertaining reading; an engineering as-
sessment of the problem is more mundane (fig. 10.) While the unstart effects on this air-
plane are certainly more severe than those shown previously, it is most important to realize
why this is so, and why an extrapolation of these results to an HSCT is not valid.
Undoubtedly, the unstart problems experienced by the YF-12 airplane in its development
phase were severe, and the source of many of the aforementioned pilot comments. The re-
suits shown in figure 10 were obtained with the production stability augmentation system
and automatic inlet control system operating, and still show significant accelerations and
displacements of the airplane caused by the unstart; note that recovery from the condition
used up over half the available lateral-directional control power. This behavior is largely the
result of configuration attributes which are unlikely to be shared by an HSCT airplane. For
example, the relative size (thrust) and placement of the YF- 12 powerplants are very differ-
ent from the four-engine underwing installations proposed for most HSCT airplanes. The
YF-12 nacelle itself contibutes to some stability and control problems due to the design and
operation of the various bypass and bleed provisions; reference 13 contains a description of
some of these effects. The higher thrust-weight ratio, higher cruise altitude and Mach num-
ber, and lower cruise lift-drag ratio of the YF-12 / SR-71 compared to current HSCT con-
cepts are also important differences influencing the airplane's response.
YF-12 Inlet Unstart Response
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The points listed in the table below are largely self-explanatory, but require some addi-
tional comment. Most importantly, the results of this study of the inlet unstart problem indi-
cate that the mixed-compression inlet unstart is not a severe enough problem,from a
passenger safety standpoint, to prohibit their consideration for current HSCT concepts.
However, it would be desirable to examine the unstart problem further through more sophis-
ticated analyses in order to develop a better understanding of the design drivers behind the
vehicle effects. A design methodology could then be developed which would permit rapid
screening and evaluation of inlet/airframe configurations with regard to inlet unstart suscep-
tibility and effects. A large question concerning passenger acceptance of the startle upon an
unstart still remains, and should be addressed through appropriate studies.
Conclusions and recommendations
o Inlet unstart on HSCT is an importantdesign concern
o Unstart is not likely to be a Mach number selection driver :
o Unstart does not appear to be a critical flight safety issue
hindering HSCT development or operation
o The automatic engine management and flight controls on an
HSCT would minimize airplane motions; however, passenger
startle may be a more difficult problem
o Other flight conditions should be examined
o More sophisticated studies are probably warranted
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